martphone motion sensors provide cybersecurity attackers with a stealthy way to eavesdrop on nearby acoustic information. Eavesdropping on touchtones emitted by smartphone speakers when users input numbers into their phones exposes sensitive information such as credit card information, banking PINs, and social security card numbers to malicious applications with access to only motion sensor data. This work characterizes this new security threat of touchtone eavesdropping by providing an analysis based on physics and signal processing theory. We show that advanced adversaries who selectively integrate data from multiple motion sensors and multiple sensor axes can achieve over 99% accuracy on recognizing 12 unique touchtones. We further design, analyze, and evaluate several mitigations which could be implemented in a smartphone update. We found that some apparent mitigations such as low-pass filters can undesirably reduce the motion sensor data to benign applications by 83% but only reduce an advanced adversary’s accuracy by less than one percent. Other more informed designs such as anti-aliasing filters can fully preserve the motion sensor data to support benign application functionality while reducing attack accuracy by 50.1%.